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Abstract: 
The growth in evaluation practice has not always gone hand in hand with an increase 
in the actual quality of these evaluations. This article addresses this concern, by examining the 
factors that explain organisational variety in the application of evaluation quality assurance 
measures. We present the results of an analysis of eighteen Flemish (Belgian) public sector 
organisations. To unravel different explanatory trajectories, we combine two comparative 
methods that rely on Boolean analysis: the most similar different outcome/most different 
similar outcome technique on the one hand, and crisp set qualitative comparative analysis on 
the other hand.  
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The growth in evaluation practice worldwide has not been matched by an equal 
growth in the quality of evaluations. Several studies are pessimistic about the quality of 
evaluation reports (e.g. Forss et al., 2008; Johnsen et al., 2001; Borrman & Stockmann, 2009). 
Evaluative information would even face a credibility crisis (Schwartz & Mayne, 2005). This 
negative diagnosis is surprising, especially in light of the many efforts to develop evaluation 
standards and quality assurance models. To be sure, evaluation quality assurance measures are 
not everywhere applied to the same extent. Yet, little is known about the conditions that 
promote or impede the application of evaluation quality assurance mechanisms (Schwartz & 
Mayne, 2005). The literature offers fragmented insights only, that are mostly of anecdotal 
nature and have seldom been tested systematically. This article aims to fill this empirical void, 
via systematically scrutinizing the evaluation quality assurance practices of eighteen public 
sector organizations in Flanders (Belgium). 
It pursues two objectives. First, we test the explanatory relevance of a large number of 
conditions that might possible explain organisational variety in the extent of evaluation 
quality assurance. We identified these conditions in the evaluation literature and through 
explorative interviews . Second, we unravel the combinations of conditions that can explain 
high evaluation quality assurance at organisational level. We consider it not very plausible to 
come to any universal law-like formula for explaining variety in evaluation quality control. 
But we assume that it is nonetheless possible to find patterns behind similarities and 
differences. Systematic insights into the conditions of the usage of evaluation quality 
arrangements can moreover be useful for practice that seek professional development, and 
advocate better evaluation policies (Cooksy & Mark, 2011; Cooksy & Caracelli, 2005). The 
quality with which evaluations are conducted is after all considered to be one of the 
determinants of their use (Leviton & Hughes, 1981; Cooksy & Caracelli, 2005; European 
Commission, 2012; Schwartz & Mayne, 2005). In the following section, we explain how we 
conceive the outcome variable of this research, i.e. the extent of evaluation quality assurance 
by public sector organizations. Next, we present the state of evaluation praxis of the Flemish 
public sector, our case area. In a subsequent part, we discuss the methodology. We present the 
data collection strategy, we clarify the choice for an explorative approach, and we introduce 
the two Boolean methods used (Most Similar Different Outcome/Most Different Similar 
Outcome technique (MSDO/MDSO) and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) ). The 
remainder of the article, then, is organized around the two research questions. With the 
MSDO/MDSO technique, we identify the conditions that are most relevant to explain 
organizational variety in evaluation quality assurance. With QCA, we examine how the 
conditions, identified as having most explanatory potential, interact. The conclusion re-
iterates our findings and formulates suggestions for further research. 
 
Evaluation quality assurance by public sector organizations 
From the many possible conceptualizations of evaluation, the present research deals 
with ‘policy’ evaluations. We define these as a ‘scientific analysis of a certain policy (or part 
of a policy) aimed at determining the merit or worth of the evaluand on the basis of certain 
criteria (such as: effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, etc.)’ (based on Scriven, 1991). With 
the notion scientific, we refer to the application of science-based methods. The definition does 
not imply that an evaluation should be conducted by scientists. Rather, it stresses the research-
based link of evaluation. It highlights the fact that evaluation provides a systematic and 
transparent assessment of an object. The evaluations of our interest pertain to a large array of 
possible evaluanda, including evaluations on the content of the policy, the process, or the 
effect, and impact of the policy.  
While evaluators share a commitment to high quality evaluations, they do not always 
agree on what this exactly entails. As Benson, Hinn, & Lloyd (2001: ix) stated: “There may 
be as many definitions of quality as there are interpretations of experience”.  Evaluators work 
in a large variety of settings, and often have different values and beliefs about what is 
important in their work (Cooksy & Mark, 2011). As a result of this, the evaluation literature is 
full of guidelines and checklists (a selective overview can be consulted at Mande, 2011), often 
highlighting different elements (Widmer, 2005). Cooksy & Caracelli (2005: 34-35) compared 
various evaluation standards and made an overview of the large range of quality criteria that 
circulate in the evaluation literature. They identified criteria as utility, feasibility, propriety, 
accuracy, transparency, relevance, balance, credibility, legitimacy, cultural competence, … all 
given a different emphasis due to different expectations of an evaluation.  As Benson et al. 
(2001: ix) stated:  “A complex array of contingencies- in both local contexts and larger socio-
political systems- shape stakeholders’ particular experiences of program quality”. 
In this article, we approach evaluation quality from an organisational stance. Rather 
than assessing the quality of individual evaluation reports, we focus on the organisational 
system within which the evaluation process occurs. By approaching quality from the 
perspective of the evaluation quality assurance system of the organisation, we emphasize the 
intention to deliver high quality reports, rather than the actual quality. The eventual quality 
after all strongly depends on numerous intervening factors, such as for instance the 
willingness and ability of external evaluators to produce high quality reports. In this 
contribution, we will focus on a set of quality criteria that we assume to be always important, 
irrespective of context and purpose of the evaluation, and of the evaluation model. In the 
methodology section of this article, we will explain the specific quality criteria used. 
 
Policy evaluation in Flanders 
Furubo and Sandahl (2002) identified two different waves of diffusion of evaluation in 
Europe, respectively taking place in 1960’s -1970’s and end 1990’s. The first group of   
countries (including Sweden, Germany, UK) adopted evaluation mainly as a package 
following internal and domestic pressures. For the larger, second group of countries, in turn,  
external factors were the main motor for diffusion. The introduction of New Public 
Management (NPM), with the associated promotion of policy evaluation as an accountability 
tool (Van de Meer, 2007), and the pressure of international institutions as the European Union  
were major catalysts for change. Belgium is clearly a member of this second group of 
countries (Jacob, Varone, & De Winter, 2005).  
The present study focuses on the Flemish public sector, i.e. the administration of the 
Flemish Region and the Flemish Community. Whereas the Flemish Region has powers in 
territory-related fields (such as environment and agriculture), the Flemish Community has 
language-based competencies (such as education and culture). The Flemish administration is a 
particularly interesting research object, as it relatively recently (in 2006) underwent a major 
reshuffling following the principles of NPM. With these reforms, policy evaluation became 
formally anchored in the task prescription of departments and agencies. Departments are 
charged with the evaluation of instruments, outputs and outcomes of policy implementation. 
Agencies, in turn, are required to provide the necessary input for these evaluations (Vlaams 
Parlement, 2003). Triggered by the reforms, evaluation is now widely practiced by 
departments and agencies, albeit still major discrepancies exist between policy fields. For our 
purposes, the study of Flanders is relevant, as it can shed light on the conditions that foster or 
impede the implementation of quality assurance in public sector organizations modelled along 
the NPM logic. Our findings can be instructive for other second wave countries, in which 
evaluation practices are also recently introduced. Besides, our analysis offers an alternative to 
the studies on evaluation quality assurance that exclusively focus on the world leaders in the 
practice of evaluation (e.g. Schwartz & Mayne, 2005). 
 
Methodology 
Data collection 
As for the selection of the specific public organisations, we approached the 
departments and autonomized agencies of all policy fields, with a vertical focus:  (1) 
education; (2) work and social economy; (3) mobility and public works; (4) well-being and 
public health; (5) housing and spatial planning; (6) economy and innovation; (7) agriculture; 
(8) environment, nature and energy. We first determined which entities were active in 
evaluation, based on interviews and document analysis (i.e. the scrutiny of evaluation 
reports). Organisations that met this criterion were asked to complete a survey. As explained 
above, we study the extent to which an organization applies evaluation quality measures. In 
Flanders, employees dealing with policy evaluation are situated in a wide scale of positions in 
the organization chart. We therefore contacted the heads of the organizations asking who we 
could best approach for answering questions on evaluation quality assurance by the 
organization. Our respondents occupied positions such as scientific attaché; head of the units 
‘management and strategy’, ‘policy and finance’ or ‘planning and organization’; and director 
of the ‘research unit’. Only those organisations that participated in the interview and in the 
survey were selected as cases. The preceding interview was necessary to discuss our 
conceptualization of policy evaluation in depth, and to gather detailed narrative information 
from the organisation. The stringent selection exercise resulted in eighteen cases. They 
concern a large variety of departments and agencies . Examples are the Public Transport 
Agency, the Social Housing Company, the Employment Service, the Public Waste Agency, 
the Energy Agency, the Agency of Youth Welfare. To come to a valid assessment for each 
case, interviews with special advisors of the different sector ministers were planned to double-
check the data received from the organisations themselves. 
 
An open approach  
As for the selection of conditions, we purposefully apply an eclectic and open 
approach. Rather than delimiting the analysis to a predefined selection of conditions, we 
analyze the explanatory value of a rich variety of organisational characteristics that are 
potentially relevant to understand evaluation quality assurance. We share the point of view of 
Katzenstein and Okawara (2001: 167) who claimed that analytical eclecticism, in which the 
causal importance of different types of factors is taken into account (e.g. structure; agency; 
…) is highly needed to understand complex social and political phenomena. In absence of 
available systematic evidence on organisational variety in evaluation quality measures, we 
consider this the most fruitful strategy to advance the field. The research mainly proceeded in 
an inductive way. To come to a list of conditions with potential explanatory relevance, we 
combined two sources. First, we conducted an extensive screening of the evaluation literature. 
Most explanatory indications were found in the evaluation capacity building (ECB) literature. 
We continued our search for variables until we reached a point of saturation, in which no new 
variables were encountered. Complementary to literature screening, other relevant 
explanatory conditions emerged inductively through explorative interviews with top managers 
and evaluation staff of the field of education and training. This domain, commonly known as 
the pioneer in evaluation practice in Flanders, constituted our pilot case. The mixed approach 
of field work and literature review yielded a large list of potentially interesting conditions.  
These conditions were subsequently ordered in five major categories. For this purpose, 
we were inspired by the principles underlying the actor centered neo-institutionalist 
framework (ACI), developed by Fritz Scharpf (1997). We deliberately used a ‘framework’, 
instead of a specific theory. As Scharpf (1997: 30) argued, instead of providing detailed 
general law-like regularities, the framework provides a descriptive language, which allows for 
the comparison of uniquely qualified cases by showing how a particular constellation of 
factors could bring about a specific effect. In other words, we rely on ACI as a heuristic tool 
to bring more structure in the inductively derived conditions. Although sharing a lot of 
premises with historical neo-institutionalism, ACI offers us a more suitable vehicle to tackle 
the challenges of this research. Most of the applications of historical neo-institutionalism 
generally relate to macro issues of socio-economic history, which are much broader than a 
phenomenon such as evaluation quality assurance of organizations. Secondly, many historical 
neo-institutionalist inspired works are characterized by long narratives that do not really 
provide clear analytical concepts (Witte, 2006). Thirdly, historical neo-institutionalist 
research ideally requires longitudinal historical analyses. Given the reshuffling of the Flemish 
public sector in 2006, we do not consider it feasible to get extensive and valid data from the 
past.  Three elements supported the choice for ACI. First, it has been inductively grounded in 
and particularly developed for policy analysis. Second, ACI stands out for its feasible and 
relatively easily operationalisable definitions of actors, institutions and the relationships 
between both (Witte, 2006). Third, ACI fits very well with the assumptions behind the 
methodological strategy followed in this research. Scharpf shares the belief in conjunctural 
causation to understand complex social phenomena. In addition, ACI provides the theoretical 
justification to analyze the structure-related conditions separately from the actor-related 
conditions (see below, i.e. two step QCA).  
ACI proceeds from the conviction that “social phenomena are to be explained as the 
outcome of interactions among intentional (individual and/or collective) actors, but that these 
interactions are structured, and the outcomes shaped, by the characteristics of the institutional 
settings in which they occur” (Scharpf, 1997: 1). In line with ACI, we analytically distinguish 
between two broad explanatory dimensions, which correspond with the major research 
traditions in the social sciences: on the one hand those emphasizing agency, and those that 
stress the role of structure on the other hand. Each of these dimensions can be disentangled 
into particular explanatory categories, five in total. 
We conceptualize ‘structure’ in a broad way. We analyse the relevance of the 
characteristics of the institutional setting; characteristics of the tasks of the organisation and 
the history of the organisation.  
1. Characteristics of the institutional setting:  According to Scharpf (1997), people do not 
act on the basis of objective reality and objective needs, but on the basis of their subjectively 
defined interests, preferences and capabilities, which are, but not entirely, shaped by the 
institutional environment. Based on our duo of sources, we deduce six conditions of 
institutional nature which can frame the actions of actors: the size of the organisation; the 
extent of formal autonomy that an organisation enjoys; the legal status of the organisation 
(department or agency); the anchorage of the evaluation function; the engagement of staff in 
specialized evaluation training, and the existence of regulatory evaluation requirements to 
which the organisation is subjected.  
2. Whether evaluation quality assurance  is considered necessary and feasible by a public 
sector organization, or by its unit in charge of evaluations, will presumably depend on the ‘fit’ 
with the issue-specific characteristics of the policy organisation itself (Schmidt, 1993). The 
scrutiny of the evaluation literature combined with our interviews alerted us to four different 
policy issue related condition variables that can exert important influence. Accordingly, we 
will investigate the role of media and parliamentary attention for tasks of the organisation; 
perceived competition on tasks of the organisation; the perceived measurability of the 
organisational output and outcomes. 
3. A third category of conditions deals with the path of the organisation. With this 
category, we include more longitudinal considerations  in our research. As Scharpf (2000: 
768) states: “Not everything can be changed at the same time. In any one policy area, the 
body of existing policy must mostly be considered an invariant environment of present policy 
choices”. Accordingly, whether organisations employ evaluation quality measures, will likely 
depend on their experience with evaluations in the past. We will examine the influence of the 
length of evaluation experience; organisational stability; and ministerial stability. 
 
In line with ACI, we treat actors as a theoretically distinct category. This is based on 
the observation that policies can sometimes change when the cognitive and normative 
orientations of policy makers change, even when the external and institutional conditions 
remain constant (Scharpf, 2000).  
4. Actor orientations: Especially in the context of public sector evaluations, which 
obviously concern issues of public stake, various types of actors claim a voice. The majority 
of the testimonials of ECB sources we screened indeed referred to demand in general terms or 
by referring to the demand coming from a particular actor. In the present research, we focus 
on the influence of demand for evaluation from organisational management; minister; 
parliament; civil society organisations; and other organisations active within the same policy 
field. Finally, we test the explanatory relevance of organisation-wide support for evaluations.  
5. Besides orientations, actors are characterized by capabilities. Capabilities are 
understood as all action resources allowing an actor to influence a certain outcome. Without, 
these, actors are not able to realize their orientations. Capabilities are of all kinds and for 
instance refer to personal properties, physical resources, technological capabilities, etc. In the 
evaluation literature, the, the following capabilities are considered  relevant for achieving high 
quality evaluations : skills to conduct evaluations; budgetary resources to evaluate; 
availability of experienced staff to conduct evaluations; availability of external evaluators 
with expertise on the themes of the organisation; and the availability of monitoring 
information. The overview of conditions we finally included in the research, can be consulted 
in annex 1. Their operationalization will be discussed further in the article. 
 
Two Boolean methods of comparison 
This article covers two research questions: (1) which conditions are most relevant to 
explain organizational variety in evaluation quality assurance; and (2) how do they combine? 
To answer these questions, we sequentially apply two different Boolean techniques. They 
imply a systematic pairwise comparison of cases. 
(1) The inductive screening yielded a long list of explanatory variables that might account 
for organisational variation in the application of evaluation quality measures. To identify the 
conditions with most explanatory power, we apply the Most Similar Different Outcome/Most 
Different Similar Outcome (MSDO/MDSO) technique (De Meur, 1996). The technique is only 
rarely applied. This is surprising, especially given its potentials for explorative studies with a 
large number of conditions, which is typical for the present study too. One can recognize 
Mill’s canons of agreement and difference (1973 [1843]) in the name and logic of the 
technique (De Meur, 1996; De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1994; De Meur & Gottcheiner, 2009).  
MSDO/MDSO seeks to identify the relevant conditions that are capable to explain why a pair 
of organisations that shares a lot of organisational attributes (‘most similar’), differs in the 
extent to which evaluation quality measures are applied. To understand this different 
behavior, the (few) conditions on which these organisations differ will likely have most 
explanatory potential and are worth exploring more in depth. Inversely, we focus on 
similarities, to understand why cases that are considered ‘most different’, nonetheless have a 
similar profile in evaluation quality management (De Meur, Bursens & Gottcheiner, 2006).  
(2) The MSDO/MDSO technique assists us to identify the conditions that are most 
capable to explain organizational variety in evaluation quality assurance. Yet, such focus on 
individual conditions runs somehow counter to the complex nature of the evaluation reality, 
and the important role of context in this regard (Cooksy & Mark, 2011; Dahler-Larsen, 2012; 
Cooksy and Caracelli, 2005). We explicitly assume that it is a combination of factors (a 
conjunction) that explains the outcome, and that different combinations might produce the 
same outcome (equifinality) (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 8; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 
78). In the same vein, we expect that the effect of the presence or absence of a condition may 
differ depending on the wider context. While the MSDO/MDSO analyses identifies the 
individual conditions with most explanatory relevance, we are uncertain about which 
combinations can sufficiently explain why organisations have developed routine in using 
evaluation quality measures. For evaluation capacity building interests, having this 
information is beneficial for knowing which possible ‘recipes’ can account for routinized 
quality assurance. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is particularly suited to unravel 
these sufficient combinations of conditions. Also Scharpf (1997) is convinced that this 
approach to causality best fits the complexity of social reality. QCA’s analysis of sufficiency 
corresponds with a ‘minimisation process’, which is again engrafted on Mill, and more 
particularly his method of pairwise difference (Ragin, 2000). Concisely formulated, this 
method builds upon the assumption that ‘if two configurations differ in only one condition, 
but show the same outcome, this particular condition can be eliminated’ (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012: 105). Iteratively repeating this premise until minimisations are no longer 
possible, the result of the process is an overview of ‘prime implicants’ that can imply the 
entire set of configurations (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 109). They no longer 
comprise any explanatory ‘redundant’ variables. In the analysis section of this article, we 
explain the two techniques, MSDO/MDSO and QCA, in more detail. 
 
A binary translation of the cases 
The two techniques that we apply, rely on Boolean logic. Such logic requires a 
translation of our cases in terms of a combinations of binary (values: 0 and 1) conditions and 
outcomes. The codes ‘0’ and ‘1’ express qualitatively different states. Conditions with code 
‘1’ stand for ‘present’ in the case, while a score of ‘0’ indicates ‘absence’. The concepts 
‘present’ and ‘absent’ should not be considered in absolute terms. They can equally indicate 
nominal differences as ‘department’ versus ‘agency’, or refer to qualitative states as ‘strong’ 
versus ‘weak’, etc. Admittedly, coding our cases in dichotomous values inevitably implies a 
loss of detail. For the present research purposes, we prefer to focus on broad trends that we 
could measure in a reliable and valid way, rather than to focus on detailed nuances that could 
not be robustly measured. The latter is a side effect from using perceptions as proxies for most 
of our conditions. We observed that respondents were not always consistent in their 
perception about the extent of presence or absence of the same condition, in the interviews 
and the survey. Moreover, respondents of a single organisation did not always share the same 
nuances in perception, but agreed on broad lines. Focusing on dichotomous trends was 
therefore helpful to compensate for these differences in nuances. Furthermore, to our 
knowledge, the MSDO/MDSO technique is at present only applicable for binary coded 
settings. Annex 1 indicates how the different conditions were operationalized. The above-
mentioned survey constituted the major source for the binary translation of our data. The 
columns of annex 1 refer to the answer possibilities of the survey questions. As the table 
illustrates, for instance, no matter whether organisations assessed the availability of skills as 
‘rather sufficient’ or ‘sufficient’, a score ‘1’ was given.  
As for our outcome, i.e. the extent of evaluation quality measures applied, we chose to 
focus on those quality instruments that are most prominently present in the evaluation 
literature. The quality instruments selected suit all types of evaluations (in-house/outsourced, 
etc.). With a set of five indicators, we attempted to come to an overall judgment of the 
evaluation quality assurance at an organisational level. These indicators represent a mixture of 
structural, formative and summative approaches to evaluation quality assurance. Structural 
approaches refer to efforts in using guidelines and standards in evaluation. Formative 
approaches are quality assurance measures that aim to check quality during the course of 
conducting the evaluation work. And summative approaches refer to the assessment of 
evaluation quality once the evaluation report is finished (Schwartz & Mayne, 2005: 4-5). We 
specifically measured the extent of presence of the following indicators per organisation: (1) 
appointment of a steering committee or working group for the evaluations; (2) involvement of 
second readers for evaluation reports and interim versions; (3) involvement of stakeholders in 
the evaluation process; (4) conduct of meta-evaluations, which assess previous evaluation 
studies; and (5) use of evaluation manuals. Besides these five quality instruments, we asked 
organisations whether they apply any other quality measures. Each case was scored on the 
presence of the various quality assurance instruments, by asking respondents about the extent 
of the application of these quality tools. Scores per instrument ranged from 0 (never applied), 
1 (when occasionally applied) and 2 (when systematically applied for all evaluations). The 
sum of the scores constitutes our composite indicator for this outcome variable.  
-INSERT TABLE 1- 
Comparing the use of quality assurance instruments across the cases, two major 
groups can be identified. On top of table 1 (indicated in bold and italics), we list the few 
organisations for which a variety of quality assurance mechanisms are common practice. They 
obtain a minimum score of 7. They all share the habit of composing steering or working 
groups for each evaluation and to involve second readers. In addition, they rely on manuals 
for their evaluations, at least on an occasional basis. One of the organisations already 
conducted meta-evaluations for a specific subtype of its evaluations. The use of this type of 
quality instrument does not seem to be habitual practice yet in the Flemish context. Besides 
the quality instruments directly assessed, one organisation also reported having developed an 
‘evaluability assessment’ procedure, as compulsory practice prior to every evaluation 
considered. All but one organisation of this group also engaged stakeholders in their 
evaluation processes. Involving stakeholders is probably the most contested element of the 
quality mechanisms studied. Whether we include it or not, the distribution of organisations 
across the two groups would remain unchanged.  
Lower down in the table are the bulk of organisations for which quality assurance 
instruments are not yet mainstreamed. Their overall scores range from 1 to 5. Whereas most 
indeed have the tradition of working with steering or working groups or with second readers, 
they only ‘occasionally’ work with evaluation manuals. Apparently, meta-evaluations are, for 
this group, also a step ‘too far’. The identification of these two groups paves the way to code 
our outcome in binary terms. The ‘top group’ receives a score of ‘1’. The group with 
‘laggards’ is assigned score ‘0’. The table in annex 2 gives the overview of binary scores for 
all cases.   
 
Which individual conditions have most explanatory power? 
To answer  this  first  research question, we applied  the MSDO/MDSO  technique. Restricted by the 
size of this article, we focus on the main characteristics of the technique, and refer to more 
extensive descriptions elsewhere (see e.g. De Meur, 1996; De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1996; 
De Meur, Bursens & Gottcheiner, 2006; De Meur & Gottcheiner, 2009). MSDO/MDSO 
requires three separate analyses: a comparison of (1) most different organisations for which a 
variety of quality assurance mechanisms are common practice (grey zone of the table in annex 
2); (2) most different organisations for which these instruments are not yet mainstreamed 
(white zone in the table); and (3) most similar organisations but with a different evaluation 
quality profile (grey zone versus white zone).  
 To determine which pairs of cases are ‘most similar’ or ‘most different’, we relied on 
the binary data table. To measure the distance (proximity) between two cases, we simply 
counted the number of Boolean conditions in which they differ (are similar). To get a nuanced 
assessment of (dis)similarity, MSDO/MDSO requires the identification of categories that 
cluster related conditions. Our theoretical approach, ACI, provides the framework for the 
identification of the relevant categories for the present work. Compare for instance DEPT3 
and DEPT11. They respectively differ in two; one; two; one and one conditions for the five 
explanatory categories. In MSDO/MDSO, (dis)similarities are first calculated per category 
and then aggregated (De Meur, 1996). As such, we get a comprehensive image of the breadth 
and depth of (dis)similarity between cases. Having the Boolean distances computed for each 
pair of cases made it possible to identify the minimum distance for pairs of cases with a 
different value on the outcome variable (MSDO) and the maximum distance for pairs with the 
same value for the routinization of evaluation (MDSO) (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009). 
Those pairs that differ most from each other can be said to differ at 'level 0' D(0). ‘Level 1’ 
D(1) is 1 away from ‘level 0’, whether there is a pair with this value of distance or not. The 
inverse reasoning was followed to calculate the similarity levels S(0) to S(k) between cases 
for MSDO (De Meur, 1994). As an assisting tool in the pairwise comparison of cases, we 
relied on the MSDO/MDSO software (beta-version 8/7/2006), developed by G. De Meur 
(available via http://www.jchr.be/01/beta.htm). Only those pairs of cases that reach levels 
S(0)/D(0) and/or S(1)/D(1) for the highest number of ‘categories’ (h) were given this status.  
 Once these pairs were identified, we looked for the conditions that matter most in the 
categories for which the cases concerned were most (dis)similar. This exercise was conducted 
for each of the above mentioned zones. We only kept the conditions that were at least 
mentioned twice across several (dis)similar pairs of cases. Table 2 lists the conditions that met 
this criterion for the presence and the absence of evaluation quality assurance measures.  
-INSERT TABLE 2- 
 
 
First of all, the cases with a substantial number of quality measures can rely on skilled 
staff who know how to conduct evaluations in-house. Not surprisingly, knowledge of 
evaluation makes staff members more sensitive for the importance of quality assurance 
measures. Interestingly, budgetary impediments to evaluation are not a major obstacle to the 
introduction of systematic quality measures within the organisation. On the contrary, they can 
serve as a possible incentive not to waste precious financial sources and to conduct the 
evaluations with utmost care. Providing high quality evaluations is not necessarily a costly 
operation. The absence of external evaluation experts (consultants, researchers, etc.) neither 
constitutes a major hindrance to institutionalize quality measures. Furthermore, in our case 
setting, ministerial demand for evaluations turns out to be essential to proceed to high quality 
arrangements. Explaining this observation is not straightforward. Presumably a lot will 
depend on the character and the specific background of the minister in charge. As a 
respondent testifies: the profile of the sector minister will not only influence the “frequency of 
evaluation questions, but also the level of detail, the granularity of the evaluation questions, 
and the degree of demandingness”.  We return to this issue, in the analysis of sufficiency. In 
addition, the length of evaluation experience of the organisation is of key relevance. We 
herewith refer to whether the organisation already practiced evaluation prior to the NPM 
reforms. The development of high quality arrangements is a process that requires maturing 
with the practice of evaluation. Those organisations that only recently engaged in policy 
evaluation did not yet move to the systematic introduction of evaluation quality checks. 
As for the other more structural conditions, the anchorage of the evaluation function 
has a key explanatory value. In our case area, anchorage ranges from having a large 
evaluation unit to the organisation having just one single staff member in charge of the 
coordination of evaluations. No matter the modalities of anchorage, we observe that an 
anchored evaluation function creates professional capacity for evaluation and makes it easier 
to systematically introduce quality measures for evaluations. The staff members working in 
these units operate as important ‘mediators’, or ‘evaluation quality guides’. In many instances 
in Flanders, the installation of an evaluation unit provided the momentum to structurally 
embed quality arrangements in the organisation.  The position of international evaluation 
requirements is equally remarkable. Although typically considered critical for the diffusion of 
evaluation practices around the globe (Furubo & Sandahl, 2002), evaluation requirements by 
international institutions (i.e. European Union) do not always seem to be of key importance 
for explaining why organisations have substantially developed quality measures. As we will 
reveal later in the article, the effect of these requirements will depend on a favorable actor 
constellation.  
Turning to the conditions of most explanatory relevance for cases with low quality 
assurance, the analysis again highlights the importance of an anchored evaluation function; 
though this time it focuses on its absence. While the presence of the evaluation unit was 
conducive to institutionalize evaluation quality measures within several Flemish 
organisations, the absence of such unit proved to hamper the introduction of quality measures. 
Additionally, organisational instability seems to impede the implementation of quality 
measures. Several organisations that had been heavily reshuffled after NPM reforms reported 
having other priorities than introducing evaluation quality measures. An interviewee 
described it as follows: “At this moment, we are in a starting phase. In a first stage we focus 
on data collection and monitoring. We conduct some evaluations on an ad hoc basis, but these 
are not very well developed yet”.   
The MSDO/MDSO analysis finally reveals some other conditions that can explain 
why ‘most similar’ pairs of cases differ in evaluation quality profile, and/or that can explain 
why ‘most different’ pairs of cases have a similar profile, but these conditions not always 
match with the same outcome value across different pairs of cases. Three conditions have this 
ambiguous status: evaluation demand from civil society organisations; evaluation clauses 
embedded in Flemish legislation, and measurability of outcomes. They have, at first sight, a 
weaker explanatory weight compared to the conditions that consistently match with the same 
outcome values. But, as these conditions can possibly play a decisive explanatory role in 
combination with other conditions, we will nonetheless include them in our ‘analysis of 
sufficiency’ below. 
 
Which combination(s) of conditions can explain the high usage of evaluation quality 
measures?  
A QCA analysis of sufficiency can help to unravel how the conditions with the most 
explanatory potential, interact. Stated differently, QCA can assist in finding the combinations 
of conditions that lead to a high usage of evaluation quality measures. We proceeded in two 
steps. Among practitioners of configurational comparative methods, this two-step approach 
has increasingly gained ground (Mannewitz, 2011; Schneider and Wagemann, 2006). In a first 
step, our analysis just includes the structural conditions. Only if these can not account for a 
fully sufficient explanation (consistency percentage of 100, see below), the conditions of 
more actor-oriented nature are included (on top of the remote conditions which prove 
relevant). For our research purposes, this approach is extremely apt. As Scharpf (1997: 764) 
explains: “actors and their interacting choices, rather than institutions, are the proximate 
causes of policy responses whereas institutional conditions, to the extent that they are able to 
influence actor choices, are conceptualized as remote causes”. The explicit distinction 
between causal remoteness and proximity offers a powerful analytical tool to come to more 
subtle explanations. As remote conditions constitute the setting in which the actor interactions 
take place, for many purposes, knowledge of these factors will be sufficient to understand a 
particular situation. If that is the case, there is in theory no analytical need to descend to a 
more proximate level of analysis (Scharpf, 1997; 2000). Besides its theoretical value, the two-
level strategy is a useful vehicle to cope with the large number of conditions of our 
explorative research (Schneider and Wagemann, 2003, Mannewitz, 2011). 
 With QCA, we intend to unravel the trajectories to evaluation quality assurance, that 
no longer comprise any redundant conditions. To achieve more parsimony, QCA provides the 
possibility to make simplifying assumptions about non-observed combinations of conditions 
(logical remainders), for which we can hypothesize the likely outcome (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012: 151). These non-observed combinations differ in plausibility (Ragin & 
Sonnett, 2004). The most parsimonious solution can be obtained by including all remainders, 
no matter their theoretical or empirical plausibility. Given the lack of available theoretical and 
empirical evidence to make plausible assumptions, we predominantly rely, however, on the 
type of complex solution (i.e. the one that bars all remainders). Yet, the difference between 
the most complex solution and the most parsimonious solution offers the interesting 
possibility to make a causal distinction between core causal conditions and peripheral 
conditions (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008). With Fiss (2011), we conceive causal coreness in terms 
of the strength of the evidence in relation to the outcome. Core conditions are those that are 
shared by the two solutions, i.e. the complex and the parsimonious one. They can be 
surrounded by peripheral conditions, which correspond with the conditions that are eliminated 
in the parsimonious solution, but which feature in the most complex solution. Removing the 
peripheral conditions would imply the inclusion of counterfactuals, for which we cannot judge 
the plausibility of occurrence.  
 Within the scope of the present paper, we only present the findingsi of the 
minimization for those cases in which evaluation quality assurance is routine. 
 
-INSERT TABLES 3a & 3b- 
 
Minimizing the remote conditions reduces the evaluation reality of the five cases using 
evaluation quality measures to two different paths (table 3a). Both paths share the presence of 
an evaluation unit, and the acquisition of pre-reform evaluation experience. All of our cases 
that systematically apply evaluation quality measures already practiced evaluation prior to the 
NPM oriented reforms.  
A first path, capable of explaining 60% of the raw coverage, highlights the beneficial 
importance of organisational stability, as a core requirement to mainstream evaluation quality 
checks. This path is especially applicable for organisations with outcomes that are difficult to 
measure. This refers to these organisations that do not easily provide tangible services or 
products. Typically, although not exclusively, departments, especially since the NPM reforms, 
consider their outcomes as more difficult to measure than do agencies. The difficulty of 
measurability constitutes no hindrance, however, to deploy quality arrangements. Instead, it 
makes evaluation units consider the deployment of quality measures more necessary so as to 
check how evaluators cope with the outcomes that are difficult to measure. The lack of 
international evaluation requirements is not an obstacle to make these organisations 
implement systematic quality measures.  
The remaining 40% of the empirical coverage can be explained by a second path, in 
which international evaluation requirements nonetheless play a core role. The three empirical 
cases to which this path is applicable (DEPT3; DEPT11 and INTALP3) are active in policy 
sectors that receive European structural funds. They are not subjected to evaluation clauses in 
Flemish legislation and operate in a setting that recently underwent major reshufflings. 
However, this constellation of remote conditions can, on its own, not account for a fully 
sufficient explanation (consistency: 100%), as INTALP3 did not develop substantial quality 
arrangements. Supplementary conditions, of more actor oriented nature, thus needed to be 
inserted.  
The minimization of the proximate conditions for these cases in scenario 2 can be 
summarized into one single core constellation, with the ministerial demand for evaluations as 
a core condition (table 3b). As we alluded to above, the type of actor demanding evaluation 
will influence the perceived need of organisations to implement quality measures. In our case 
setting, ministerial demand for evaluations turns out to be essential for proceeding to high 
quality arrangements. This is particularly what the two cases, DEPT3 and DEPT11, with 
institutionalized quality arrangements distinguishes from case INTALP3. INTALP 3 indeed 
lacks this quality reflex. The fact that the sector minister of DEPT11 was an academic 
clarifies a lot. Obviously, also the special ministerial advisors will here have a great stake. For 
some respondents, the influence of these advisors is more decisive than the influence of the 
sector minister him/herself. Other factors, of peripheral importance, are the condition 
referring to the evaluation demand from civil society and the skills to conduct-in house 
evaluations. The availability of a pool of external evaluators is substitutable with the 
availability of the budgetary means to evaluate.  
 Conclusion 
Overall, the extent of evaluation quality assurance in the Flemish NPM-modeled 
administration is rather limited. The analyses of the distinguishing traits of the five 
organisations where evaluation quality measures are common practice versus the thirteen 
organisations where this is not (yet) the case directs theorists and practitioners to several 
decisive factors. In this conclusion, we would like to highlight the major explanatory factors, 
with the broader configurational picture in mind.  
A first, and empirically most relevant element, is the beneficial role of an evaluation 
unit for the implementation of high quality measures. Regardless of the modalities of 
anchorage, the civil servants occupying the evaluation function importantly contribute to the 
systematic incorporation of quality measures within the organisation. They act as ‘evaluation 
quality mediators’ or ‘evaluation quality agents’.  
Second, but much less empirically and theoretically strong, the application of 
evaluation quality measures is restricted to those organisations that practiced evaluation prior 
to the NPM reforms. The development of an evaluation attitude is a time consuming process, 
and so is the structural embedding of evaluation quality arrangements.  
Thirdly, legislative evaluation requirements matter. The organisations that need to 
comply with international evaluation clauses comparably deploy more evaluation quality 
assurance mechanisms. The underlying mechanism is presumably to be sought in the 
evaluation training that are imposed together with the clauses. Such training usually involves 
instructions on good quality evaluations. An awareness of good practices makes organisations 
tempted to apply the quality instructions also to other evaluations, which are not initiated by 
legislation. This line of reasoning is conditional, however, on the presence of a beneficial 
actor constellation.  
In this respect, we want to emphasize the quintessential role of evaluation demand 
from the sector minister and his/her advisors as a fourth condition with high discriminatory 
potential. An important intermediary element in this regard, as we can speculate, is the 
background and character of the minister in charge, and especially of his or her personal 
advisors. The pace of evaluating will often not match the pace of political decision making.  
The extent to which quality measures are systematically employed, can possibly also 
influence the length of the evaluation process. Feedback of steering groups, for instance, 
might lead to an extension of the fieldwork, to the conduct of additional analyses, etc. The 
attitude, and voluntarism of the minister vis-à-vis evaluation can then be decisive for creating 
or subtracting space to apply evaluation quality measures.  
Organisational stability completes our list of most remarkable influencing conditions. 
Out of the eighteen organisations studied, only five did not undergo substantial structural 
changes. Three of these five are among the group of cases where evaluation quality measures 
are common practice. A stable environment seems conducive to the systematic deployment of 
quality measures.  
Taking stock of the conditions with core explanatory power, we can derive some 
practical lessons for evaluation capacity building. On a negative note, the promotion of 
quality measures will not be evident for cases without a beneficial historical legacy, as all of 
our cases that apply evaluation quality measures have some years of experience with 
evaluating. Our analyses nonetheless give some hints for cases where this experience is 
lacking. The installation of an evaluation unit, for instance, can be an important vehicle to 
structurally embed quality arrangements in the organisation. Alternatively, the introduction of 
evaluation clauses in legislation may help. Not just because of the clause itself, but supposing 
that these are associated with the provision of relevant training in good quality evaluation 
practice. Where there is a favorable actor constellation, these measures can help to trigger 
more organisations incorporating substantial quality arrangements.  
Flanders is a case within the second wave of countries or regions to develop 
evaluation. In this group, external (EU) and NPM pressures played a major role in the 
diffusion of evaluation (Furubo & Sandahl, 2002). We believe that the findings of the present 
study can be useful for other countries in the same group. From a methodological perspective, 
the article has demonstrated the strength of MSDO/MDSO and two step Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis to bring clarity in the contingent evaluation praxis. The combination of 
the techniques was particularly helpful to deal with the large number of conditions that were 
included in this explorative study. Future research could elaborate on the precise weight of the 
conditions that we identified with the MSDO/MDSO technique. Also, the causal process and 
mechanisms behind the sufficient combinations of condition, merit further analysis.  
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Annex 1. Overview of conditions, their indicators, and dichotomization thresholds  
Conditions Code 0 
indicators 
Code 1 
indicators 
Category A: Capabilities of the organisation 
(1) Skills to conduct evaluations,   
(2) Financial means to evaluate,  
(3) Availability of staff capable to evaluate, 
(4) Availability of external evaluators,  
(5) Availability of monitoring information 
Totally insufficient, 
rather insufficient 
Rather sufficient, 
fully sufficient 
Category B: Orientations 
Evaluation demand from:  
(6) Organisational management,  
(7) Sector minister,  
(8) Parliament,  
(9) Civil society organisations,  
(10) Other organisations  
No demand, hardly any 
demand 
Sometimes demand, 
frequent demand 
(11) Extent  of organisation-wide support for 
evaluations  
Not at all, to limited 
extent 
To major extent, to 
large extent 
Category C: Conditions with regard to the institutional setting 
(12) Organisational size  Very low, low material At least average 
weight (*) material weight 
(13) Organisational autonomy  No legal personality Legal personality 
(14) Organisational status  Agency Department 
(15) Anchorage of evaluation function  No evaluation unit Formal or de facto 
evaluation unit 
(16) Participation of staff in evaluation 
trainings  
No participation in 
evaluation trainings 
Minimally 
‘sometimes’ 
participating in 
evaluation trainings  
Evaluation requirements stipulated in:  
(17) regulation or decrees at Flemish level,  
(18) legislation/regulation at EU level, 
(19) management agreement of organisation 
No evaluation 
requirements 
Evaluation 
requirements 
Category D: Conditions concerning policy issue characteristics 
(20) Attention by media or parliament for the 
tasks of the organisation  
Not at all, limited, rather 
limited  
Rather much, much, 
very much 
Highest score of the assessments of attention by 
each of these ‘institutions” 
(21) Perceived competition on tasks of the 
organisation  
Not at all, limited, rather 
limited 
Rather much, much, 
very much 
(22) Perceived measurability of outputs, and 
(23) outcomes  
Average score ≤ 3 and/or 
qualification: very 
difficult, difficult, rather 
difficult 
Average score 
≥ 3 and/or 
qualification very 
easy, rather easy, 
easy 
Average score of measurability on a scale of 1 
(very difficult to measure) to 5 (very easy to 
measure) of the three most important outputs 
and outcomes of the organisation.  
 
Category E: Conditions characterizing the path of the organisation 
(24) Pre-NPM evaluation experience  No/seldom evaluation 
practice prior to the NPM 
oriented reforms 
Sometimes/frequent 
evaluation practice 
prior to the NPM 
oriented reforms 
(25) Organisational stability  Organisations which 
underwent medium or 
large changes (**) 
Organisations which 
underwent no or 
small changes 
(26) Ministerial stability  ≥ 1 minister changes 
since BAP 
No ministerial 
turnover 
 
(*)The indicator concerns both financial material weight (weight: 50%) and material weight with regard to 
personnel (weight: 50%). For financial material weight, the following scales are used [in 10 000EUR]: (1) very 
low material weight: 0-50000; (2) low material weight: 10000-50000; (3) average material weight: 50000-
100000; (4) high material weight: 100000-500000; (5) very high material weight: <500000. As for material 
weight with regard to personnel, in staff numbers per organisation: (1) very low: 0-100; (2) low: 101-200; (3) 
average: 201-400; (4) high: 401-900; (5) very high: >900. We calculated the average for the years 2007-2008-
2009 (IAVA). 
(**) Four subcriteria constitute this indicator. Three of them relate to the impact of the NPM-oriented reforms 
(which account for 60% of the indicator in total): (1) changes in the form of management/steering of the 
organisation; (2) changes with regard to the composition of the public entity; (3) changes with regard to the 
organisation of the management support services. The remaining 40% of the indicator refers to changes 
independent of the NPM reforms. Based on the sum of these subcriteria, a scale can be composed ranging from 
0.1 to 0.5, with 0.5 standing for these organisations which underwent a large number of changes; 0.3 for these 
which underwent a medium number of changes and 0.1. for these organisations which can be characterized by 
large stability. We calculated the average for the years 2007-2008-2009 (IAVA).
Annex 2. Binary data table 
 
CASE(*) 
Category A: 
Actor capabilities 
Category B: 
Actor orientations 
Category C: 
Institutional setting 
Category D: 
Policy issue 
characteristics 
Category E: 
Path of the 
organisation 
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Organisations 
with high 
evaluation quality 
assurance 
DEPT3 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
DEPT11 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
ILTALP2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
DEPT2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
DEPT8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Organisations 
with low 
evaluation quality 
assurance  
INTA2 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
DEPT7 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
INTALP3 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
INTA9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
ILTALP1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EXTA6 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
INTA5 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
EXTA2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
EXTA3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
EXTA1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
DEPT1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
DEPT5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
DEPT6 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 (*) Case codes are composed by a letter combination and a number. DEPT stands for Department; EXTA for external agencies of public nature; 
INTA for internal agencies without legal personality; INTALP for internal agencies with legal personality. The numbers are chosen at random.
Table 1: Overview of evaluation quality measures applied (scores range from 0 to 2) 
Code 
of the 
organisation 
Steering 
Committee/ 
Working 
group 
Second 
readers 
Stakeholders
Meta- 
evaluations 
Manualsii Other TOTAL 
DEPT2 2 2 2 1 2 0 9 
DEPT3 2 2 2 0 2 0 8 
DEPT8 2 2 0 0 2 2 8 
DEPT11 2 2 2 0 1 0 7 
ILTALP2 2 2 1 0 2 0 7 
ILTALP1 2 2 1 0 0 0 5 
DEPT1 2 2 1 0 0 0 5 
DEPT6 2 2 1 0 0 0 5 
DEPT7 2 2 0 0 1 0 5 
INTA9 2 2 1 0 1 0 5 
INTALP3 0 2 2 0 0 0 4 
INTA5 1 1 2 0 0 0 4 
EXTA1 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
EXTA6 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
EXTA3 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
DEPT5 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 
INTA2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
EXTA2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Most relevant conditions, identified in the MSDO/MDSO analyses  
Identification of the most relevant conditions,  
for the organisations with high evaluation quality assurance  
 Category 
BUDG(0) A 
EVCOMM(0) A 
SKINT(1) A 
DEMMIN(1) B 
ANCH(1) C 
REGINT(0) C 
LEG(1) E 
Identification of the most relevant conditions,  
for the organisations with low evaluation quality assurance  
ANCH(0) C 
ORGSTAB(0) E 
Conditions leading to ambiguous configurations (C) 
DEMCSO B 
REGFL C 
MEASOC D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3a: Configurations leading to high evaluation quality assurance.  
Results of minimisation of remote conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The notation used is based on Fiss (2011) and Ragin (2008). Full circles refer to presence of a condition; 
Crossed-out circles to absence of a condition; Large circles indicate core conditions; Small circles refer to 
peripheral conditions; Blank spaces refer to a “don’t care” situation in which the causal condition may be either 
present or absent. The different core constellations are indicated with a different number above the columns. 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF REMOTE CONDITIONS 
 1 2 
Category C. Conditions related to the institutional setting of the organisation 
Anchorage of the evaluation function  
Evaluation requirements in Flemish 
legislation 
 Ɵ 
Evaluation requirements coming from the 
European Union 
Ɵ 
Category D. Conditions related to the tasks of the organisation 
Measurability of outcomes   
Category E. Conditions related to the path of the organisation 
Pre-NPM evaluation experience  
Organisational stability  Ɵ 
Measures of fit   
Consistency 1.00 0.67 
Raw coverage 0.60 0.40 
Unique coverage 0.60 0.40 
Solution coverage: 1.00 / Solution consistency: 0.83 
 Table 3b: Configurations leading to high evaluation quality assurance.  
Results of minimisation of the proximate conditions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(*) ONLY for these cases with an evaluation unit, with pre-NPM evaluation experience, but with weak 
organisational stability, with evaluation requirements coming from the European Union, and without 
evaluation requirements stipulated in Flemish legislation. 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF PROXIMATE CONDITIONS (*) 
 2A 2B 
Category A. Actor capabilities 
Skills to conduct evaluations ● ● 
Financial means to evaluate Ɵ ● 
Availability of external evaluators ● Ɵ 
Category B. Actor orientations 
Evaluation demand coming from civil 
society organisations 
● ● 
Evaluation demand from sector minister  
Measures of fit   
Consistency 1.00 1.00 
Raw coverage 0.50*0.40=0.20 0.50*0.40=0.20 
Unique coverage 0.50*0.40=0.20 0.50*0.40=0.20 
Solution coverage: 1.00 / Solution consistency: 1.00 
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i The minimization process of the parsimonious solutions yielded thirteen contradictory simplifying 
assumptions. These were solved on the basis of the knowledge about the necessary conditions in the analysis. 
We followed the approach explained in Delreux and Hesters (2010).  
 
ii Two organisations reported to follow fixed procedures for their evaluations, but have not anchored 
these in a written document. They were given a score of 1 on this quality criterion. 
